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ABSTRACT: Middle sentences 
in English are only partly 
described within the 
Government and Binding 
theory. Some semantic and 
discourse generalizations 
which are integral to the 
meaning of these constructions 
are just set aside, if they are 
mentioned at all. The theory of 
conceptual semantics 
developed by Ray Jackendoff 
(1983, 1987, 1990) presents 
the first viable alternative to 
the syntactic strategies 
descending from Chomsky’s 
theory. In this paper I will 
examine the middle voice and 
show how several Government 
and Binding analyses of these 
constructions fail to account 
for important parts of the data. 
I hope to persuade the reader 
that a conceptual structure 
analysis of this phenomenon 
provides a more appealing 
solution which fully integrates 
the syntactic and semantic 
generalizations. 
RESUMEN: Las oraciones medias en 
inglés sólo han sido descritas 
parcialmente en la teoría de la Rección 
y el Ligamiento. Algunas 
generalizaciones semánticas y 
pragmáticas esenciales al significado 
de estas construcciones han sido 
ignoradas, a veces ni siquiera 
mencionadas. La teoría semántico-
conceptual desarrollada por Ray 
Jackendoff (1983, 1987, 1990) 
presenta la primera alternativa factible 
a las estrategias sintácticas 
descendientes de la teoría de 
Chomsky. En este trabajo examinaré 
la voz media y mostraré cómo diversos 
análisis de estas construcciones desde 
la perspectiva de la teoría de la 
Rección y el Ligamiento no consiguen 
explicar gran parte importante de los 
datos. Espero convencer al lector de 
que el análisis de este fenómeno desde 
una perspectiva semántico-conceptual 
puede proporcionar una solución más 
atractiva que integra completamente 
las generalizaciones tanto sintácticas 
como semánticas. 
RÉSUMÉ: Notre hypothèse est que dans 
l'identification des référents des 
expressions nominales contenues dans 
les énoncés exige le traitement parallèle 
de la structure morphosyntaxique, basée 
sur un ensemble de mécanismes 
inférentiels impliqués principalement 
dans la catégorie de procédure, comme 
défini par la théorie de la pertinence 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1996 et 2004). La 
représentation sémantique provient de 
l´interaction entre la dérivation de la
représentation syntaxique sémantique et
pragmatique des mécanismes 
d'interprétation par lequel vous obtenez 
une pleine forme propositionnelle, 
proposée par l´obtention des 
implications contextuelles (explicatures), 
cette forme complète propositionnel peut
être attribué conditions de vérité.
Nous cherchons à établir les catégories 
de procédure liées à la allocation  de
référence et comment agir sur les 
expressions de base nominale et D 
(eterminante). Nous essayons de 
démontrer que le montant de référence 
d'une expression nominale ne dépend 
pas seulement de contenant si ou non 
un D ou des traits contenues dans cet 
élément linguistique. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
It would be difficult to overstate the progress which has been made in 
linguistic research since the publication of Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures. 
The publication of this work began a tradition of syntactic research that 
has advanced our knowledge of language at an enormously rapid pace. 
However, in the absence of an equally well-articulated theory of semantics, 
many of the descendants of Syntactic Structures, particularly Chomsky’s 
Government and Binding theory, have been forced to incorporate many 
semantic notions into what are essentially syntactic theories. As a result, 
some constructions are either described unconvincingly, or are only half-
described. 
A construction which is only partly described is the middle voice. Some 
semantic and discourse generalizations which are integral to the meaning 
of the construction are just set aside, if they are mentioned at all. 
Unfortunately, constantly deferring semantics until some future date not 
only does not solve the problem, but also will ultimately prevent the 
problem from ever being addressed. As Ray Jackendoff (1990: 3) notes, 
Lamentably, the practice in the literature for the most part has been to match 
a highly formalized syntactic structure with a highly informal conceptual 
structure, specified only in taxonomic terms such as Agent, Patient, and 
Theme. Such practice tacitly discourages solutions other than those using the 
syntactic strategy, since any solution that makes essential use of properties of 
conceptual structure will by necessity be imprecise and informal. 
The theory of conceptual semantics developed by Ray Jackendoff (1983, 
1987, 1990) presents the first viable alternative to the syntactic strategy. 
Its rules for building up semantic representations are explicit and formal. 
Importantly, thematic roles have no independent existence. The terms 
Goal, Theme, Agent, etc. refer to specific positions in the semantic 
representation, instead of referring to whatever the writer has in mind at 
the time. In short, I believe that conceptual semantics is a way to restore a 
more equitable and more convincing division of labour between the 
syntactic and semantic components. 
The choice of the middle voice to illustrate some of the problems with 
Government and Binding theory is not arbitrary. In this paper I will 
examine the middle voice, show how several Government and Binding 
analyses of these constructions fail to account for important parts of the 
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data, and hopefully persuade the reader that a conceptual structure 
analysis of this phenomenon provides a more appealing solution which 
more fully integrates the syntactic and semantic generalizations. The inner 
semantics of sentences can be approached with a rigor which is sufficient 
to allow the researcher to say something interesting, and I intend to push 
it as far as I can. 
In Section 2 I introduce a simplified version of the theory of lexical 
conceptual structure proposed by Ray Jackendoff in order to acquaint the 
reader with the formalism which will be used throughout this paper. In 
Sections 3 and 4, I critically review several current proposals for middle 
voice formation in English, and then present a conceptual structure 
analysis which can account for both the syntactic and the semantic 
observations. 
2. AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTUAL SEMANTICS
The view of lexical conceptual structure which I shall adopt for this 
paper derives entirely from Jackendoff (1983, 1987, 1990). I have chosen 
to present a somewhat simplified version, however. This is done strictly for 
convenience, as my analysis does not depend on many of the more 
complex aspects of Jackendoff’s system. I should also note that what I am 
using I am accepting relatively uncritically. An exposition as well as a 
critique that would do justice to the material is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
The lexical conceptual structure of a category consists of two parts. In 
the spirit of autosegmental phonology, there are two “tiers” within the 
lexical conceptual structure: the thematic tier and the affectedness tier.1 
The first level is the thematic tier, which encodes information about 
causation, motion, and location. The affectedness tier encodes relations 
between Actors and Patients. 
2.1. THE THEMATIC TIER 
Rules for the formation of the thematic tier include a set of semantically 
primitive ontological categories such as thing, event, state, and path. Some 
rules for expanding basic categories into more complex ones include the 
following: 
(1a) [PLACE] --> [Place PLACE-FUNCTION ([THING])]2 
(1b) [PATH] --> [Path PATH-FUNCTION ([THING/PLACE])]3 
1 There is a third tier, the timing tier, which is introduced in Jackendoff (1987). Its specifics 
are unimportant for my discussion. 
2 Place functions include primitives such as AT, IN, and ON. 
3 Path functions include primitives such as TO, TOWARD, and VIA. 
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(1c) [EVENT] --> [Event GO ([THING], [PATH])] 
(1d) [STATE] --> [State BE ([THING], [PLACE])] 
(1e) [EVENT] --> [Event CAUSE/LET ([THING/EVENT], [EVENT])]4 
All maximal projections in the syntax correspond to a conceptual 
constituent of one of these major ontological categories. In most cases, PPs 
correspond to paths or places, an NP corresponds to a thing, and S and VP 
correspond to events or states. 
As an example, take the sentence in (2) and its conceptual structure 
representation in (3). 
(2) [S [NP John] [VP sent [NP the package] [PP to Bangor]]]
(3) [Event CAUSE ([Thing John], [Event GO ([Thing the package], [Path TO ([Thing Bangor])])])]
The S corresponds to the entire event. The first argument of CAUSE is 
the subject. The VP corresponds to the lower event headed by GO. The 
direct object, the thing in motion, is the first argument of GO. The path 
that the direct object follows corresponds to the second argument of GO, 
which is filled by the PP. 
2.2. THE AFFECTEDNESS TIER 
The affectedness tier consists of one function: AFF. The first argument 
of AFF is termed the Actor. If this Actor is volitional, the notation (+VOL) is 
added to the AFF function. The second is termed the Patient. These 
arguments encode essentially who is doing what to whom or for whom. 
Either or both of these arguments are optional, depending on the verb. The 
tests for the presence of them are the following: 
(4) For Actor: What NP did was ... 
(5) For Patient: (a) What happened to NP was ...
(b) What X did to/for/with NP was ...5
Applying these tests to the above example, we can see that, in the 
representation in (3), the NP John is the Actor and the NP the package is 
the Patient. 
(6a) What John did was send the package to Bangor. 
4 A more exhaustive list can be found in Jackendoff (1990). I have included only those 
expansions which are relevant to my paper. 
5 I am not really convinced that these two tests for Patient test the same thing, but they are 
the only tests for this position given by Jackendoff. I will tend to use (5a) when needed in 
Section 3 as it is the simpler of the two. 
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(6b) What happened to the package was John sent it to Bangor. 
 
Therefore, the complete conceptual structure representation for the 
sentence in (2) would be (7). 
 
(7) [Event CAUSE ([Thing John], [Event GO ([Thing the package], [Path TO ([Thing Bangor])])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([John], [the package]) 
 
However, to reduce redundant information, and to express the 
necessary “binding relations” between the thematic and the affectedness 
tier, the actual placement of NPs on the affectedness tier is replaced by 
Greek-letter variables coindexing with the relevant position on the 
thematic tier. That would change the representation in (7) to that of (8). 
 
(8) [Event CAUSE ([Thing John]
, [Event GO ([Thing the package]
, [Path TO ([Thing Bangor])])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
2.3. THE BUILDING UP OF CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE 
 
To see how this conceptual structure representation is built up, the first 
thing to examine is the lexical entry for those parts of the sentence which 
have lexical conceptual structure. In this case the lexical entry for the 
matrix verb in (2) would be (9). 
 
(9) send: 
 
[-N, +V] 
___ NPj <to PPk> 
[Event CAUSE ([Thing]

i, [Event GO ([Thing]

j, [Path TO ([Thing]<k>)])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
Besides the conceptual structure, the lexical entry contains the item’s 
grammatical category and its subcategorization frame. The 
subcategorization frame is interpreted in the following way: Send requires 
an NP direct object and can take an optional PP. If that option is not 
chosen, the path is simply left implicit. That is to say, “John sent the 
package” implies that the package had some destination. Linking between 
the subcategorization frame and conceptual structure is stipulated by 
Roman letter subscripts. The i subscript by definition indicates linking to 
the subject, or external argument position. While I do believe that there are 
linking regularities between conceptual structure and the rest of the 
grammar, a thorough investigation of them is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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2.4. THE TREATMENT OF THEMATIC ROLES 
 
An important aspect of Jackendoff’s system is its treatment of thematic 
roles. For Jackendoff, thematic roles have no independent existence 
outside of conceptual structure. For example, instead of having an NP be 
assigned the Goal -role, that NP is simply the first argument of the TO 
function in conceptual structure. Following Gruber (1965), who defines the 
Theme as the object in motion, the term Theme refers to the first argument 
of GO. A thematic role which will figure prominently in my analysis is the 
Agent -role. In Jackendoff’s system it breaks down into two semi-
autonomous parts: the Actor (first argument of AFF) and the extrinsic 
Instigator (first argument of CAUSE). I will occasionally use the term -role 
as a shorthand reference for a position in conceptual structure, but this is 
for convenience only. 
Returning to the sentence in (2) and its final conceptual structure 
representation in (8) (reprinted below), one would traditionally say that the 
NP John was assigned the Agent -role. 
 
(2) [S [NP John] [VP sent [NP the package] [PP to Bangor]]] 
 
(8) [Event CAUSE ([Thing John]

i, [Event GO ([Thing the package]

j, 
[Path TO ([Thing Bangor]<k>)])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
Translating this into conceptual structure terms, it is the first argument 
of CAUSE, which is linked to the Actor position on the affectedness tier. 
The NP the package is the Theme, because it appears as the first argument 
of GO on the thematic tier. Note that it is also the Patient, as the first 
argument of GO is linked to the second argument of AFF. The NP Bangor, 
being the first argument of the TO function, is the Goal. 
 
2.5. LINKING TO THE SUBCATEGORIZATION FRAME 
 
I should mention at this point the one major departure from 
Jackendoff’s notation that I will be making. Although his examples often 
indicates linking indices on the thematic tier, in order to facilitate 
capturing linking regularities, Jackendoff finally decides that linking from 
conceptual structure to the subcategorization frame is from the 
affectedness tier. A problem with this approach is that there appear to be 
verbs which do not have an affectedness tier.6 Receive is one such verb. 
                                                             
6 Jackendoff (1990) argues that receive does in fact have an affectedness tier which takes the 
form of (i). 
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(10) John received the package. 
 
(11a) *What John did was receive the package. 
(11b) *What happened to the package was John received it. 
(11c) *What happened to John was that he received the package. 
 
These tests appear to indicate that, in (10), John is neither an Actor nor 
a Patient, and that the package is not a Patient. I believe that (11a) and 
(11b) are wholly ungrammatical, and that (11c) is only grammatical on the 
interpretation that the receipt of the package had some further effect. 
Since this specific interpretation is not an essential part of the meaning of 
the verb receive, I conclude that (11c) is truly ungrammatical as well. 
Having sketched the outlines of Jackendoff’s theory of conceptual 
semantics, I shall temporarily defer its application. Instead, I would like to 
turn now to a critical examination of several proposals for the middle voice 
within the Government and Binding framework, as a prelude to a 
conceptual structure analysis in Section 4. 
 
3. SOME CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR THE MIDDLE VOICE 
 
The middle voice is a construction which seems to have many semantic 
properties, but which has traditionally been the subject of a syntactic 
analysis. In Section 3.1 I will lay out the basic facts of the middle voice in 
English that I believe that an account should explain. In Sections 3.2 and 
3.3, I will examine Fagan (1988) and Roberts (1987), which are two 
accounts within the framework of Government and Binding theory.7 Fagan 
and Roberts actually share some of the same objections, so I will present 
those objections together in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 I will examine Hale 
and Keyser (1987), which is an account which does make reference to 
lexical conceptual structure, but in a far less detailed way than 
Jackendoff. I hope to show that all three of these analyses do not account 
for crucial parts of the data, partly owing to the Government and Binding 
theory’s impoverished system of thematic relations. This will set the stage 
                                                                                                                                                           
(i) AFF ([], []) 
His argument proceeds in the following way: it is clear that the verb give has a benefactive 
Patient. 
(ii) What John did for Bill was give him a book. 
Therefore, since give is the causative alternate of receive, then receive should have a 
benefactive Patient as well, resulting in the affectedness tier in (i). 
First, I am not absolutely convinced that give is in fact the causative alternate of receive. 
Second, even if it is, I am troubled by the inability of the tests for Patient to reveal this 
benefactive Patient. 
7 The one major Government and Binding theory treatment of middles which I will not discuss 
is Keyser and Roeper (1984) for the reason that is critiqued quite extensively in Fagan (1988). 
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once again for an explanation in terms of conceptual semantics in Section 
4. 
 
 
3.1. THE MIDDLE VOICE IN ENGLISH 
 
At first glance, the middle voice might seem similar to the passive 
construction in that the verb is no longer able to assign accusative case 
and the Agent -role is suppressed. Unlike passives, however, the Agent 
can never be expressed, although it is felt to be present. Furthermore, 
there is some feeling, to my knowledge first observed in Van Oosten (1977), 
that the Patient is somehow responsible for the action of the predicate. 
 
(12) Soft bread cuts easily. 
 
(13) Soft bread cuts steak easily. 
 
(14) *Soft bread cuts easily by John. 
 
(12) is simply an ordinary example of the middle voice construction. As 
soon as a direct object in the accusative case is added, however, the 
sentence loses its middle interpretation and becomes a normal, if 
pragmatically odd, transitive sentence. When an Agent is added, the 
sentence becomes completely unacceptable. 
There are some very rigid limitations on what types of verbs can form 
acceptable middles. It seems that only transitive verbs will form good 
middles. But even within transitive verbs it seems that both verbs of 
permissive agency, as in (16), and verbs which do not assign the Agent -
role to their subjects, as in (17), will not form good middles. 
 
(15) *Fast trains arrive with no trouble. 
 
(16) *The VIPs admitted to the function with no trouble. 
 
(17) *Hard contact lenses lose easily. 
 
While it is possible that (15) could be grammatical, it would be on an 
unaccusative reading, not on a middle reading such as (18). The others are 
unacceptable on any interpretation, I believe. 
 
(18) *Fast trains are arrivable with no trouble. 
 
A second interesting fact about middle voice, at least in English, is that 
many unacceptable middle voice sentences ameliorate when placed in 
certain discourse contexts. 
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(19a) *Small towns level easily. 
(19b) Large towns are hard to level. They have strong defences and sturdy buildings. On 
 the other hand, ?/small towns level easily. 
If Van Oosten is correct to say that the use of the middle voice is an 
assertion by the speaker that properties of the surface subject are 
responsible for the action denoted by the predicate, then placing a middle 
voice sentence where it would be more likely that this could be the case 
should improve the judgement of the sentence. However, no current 
analysis of the middle voice even mentions this possibility. 
 
3.2. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FAGAN (1988) 
 
Unlike the standard Government and Binding approach, which treats 
middle voice formation as a syntactic rule similar to passive, Fagan (1988) 
sees middle voice formation as a lexical rule related to a general process 
termed “genericization”. In these genericized sentences, the expected direct 
internal argument is syntactically absent, but is interpreted generically, as 
“something,” or “everything.” See Fagan (1988: 196). 
 
(20) Managers manage. 
 
(21) Fire destroys. 
 
Following Rizzi (1986), she believes that this process of genericization 
involves “saturating” a -role in the lexicon with a rule such as (22). 
 
(22) Assign arb to the direct internal -role. 
 
To account for the fact that “saturated” -roles are not syntactically 
realized, Rizzi proposes that the Projection Principle applies only to 
lexically unsaturated -roles. 
Fagan believes that the rule for middle voice formation involves the 
following variant of the rule in (22). 
 
(23) Assign arb to the external -role. 
 
However, in middle constructions, it is not the case that there is no 
subject. To account for the fact that the direct internal argument is 
realized as the surface subject, Fagan adds (24) as part of the lexical rule 
for middle voice formation. 
 
(24) Externalize the direct -role. 
 
3.2.1. SOME OBJECTIONS TO FAGAN’S ANALYSIS 
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One problem with this analysis, especially the rule in (23), is that it is a 
strictly mechanistic operation on the argument structure of a verb. It 
blindly accepts any input, and predicts that any verb which has an 
external argument and a direct internal argument should form an 
acceptable middle. It predicts that (25) and (26) should be acceptable. 
 
(25) *Air mail letters receive easily. 
 
(26) *Hard contact lenses lose easily.8 
 
The descriptive generalization appears to be that only verbs which 
assign the Agent -role to their subjects will form acceptable middles, and 
this analysis will not capture it. 
Fagan does not wish to specify that (23) applies only to external 
arguments which are Agents because of sentences such as (27) and (28). 
 
(27) John is such a prude. He shocks easily. 
 
(28) Nervous people generally surprise easily. 
 
She believes that verbs of this type in their active form take Theme 
subjects and Experiencer objects, and if (23) applies only to those external 
arguments which are Agents, (27) and (28) will be ruled out. However, 
verbs such as shock, surprise, and excite are actually ambiguous between 
causative and non-causative readings, i.e. one in which the external 
argument is assigned the Agent -role and one in which it is assigned 
another role, perhaps the Theme -role. 
 
(29) John surprised me. 
i.e. John jumped out of the bushes and said “Boo!” 
 
(30) John surprised me. 
i.e. John had some characteristic that I did not expect. 
 
It seems clear that John is an Agent in (29), so one might say that the 
middle constructions formed from these verbs are derived from the 
causative alternates. Fagan then might be able to amend (23) so that it 
applies only to external arguments that are Agents. The problem is that 
even amending her analysis in this way does not really explain the 
descriptive generalization. It simply restates it. 
                                                             
8 Note that I am distinguishing these cases from sentences such as *Small towns level easily, 
which I believe are well-formed, but ruled out for semantic reasons, and can be acceptable in 
certain contexts. 
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3.3. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ROBERTS (1987) 
 
As was mentioned above, an analysis which is somewhat similar to 
Fagan is presented in Roberts (1987). Roberts, following Keyser and Roeper 
(1984), believes that middle voice formation is analogous to passive 
formation. It involves a variant of the externalization rule from Williams 
(1981). The rule states the following: 
 
(31) E(X): Erase the underline on the external argument, if there is one; and underline X. 
If X=0, then underline nothing. 
 
The variant proposed by Roberts is called Externalize Theme. This rule 
would operate on a verb’s -grid in the manner indicated in (32). See 
Roberts (1987: 358). 
 
(32) kill: 
 
[AGENT, 

THEME] --> [

AGENT, 

THEME] 
 
3.3.1. SOME OBJECTIONS TO ROBERTS’S ANALYSIS 
 
Since the rule in (32) is actually called “Externalize Theme,” a potential 
counterexample to this generalization would be a verb which does not 
assign the Theme -role to its object but still forms a good middle. One 
possibility might be verbs like (27) and (28) above: surprise, shock, and 
excite. If Fagan is correct to claim that these verbs assign Experiencer -
role to their objects, these would form an entire class of counterexamples 
to Roberts’s rule. 
A more important problem is this question: what happens to the Agent 
-role after the rule Externalize Theme takes place? It cannot remain 
assigned to the external argument. This would violate the -Criterion as 
both the Agent -role and the Theme -role would be being assigned to the 
same lexical item. It cannot be some internal argument because then it 
should be assigned to some internal position, following the Projection 
Principle. The Agent -role cannot be deleted either. Such a deletion would 
leave no explanation for the agency which is felt to exist in middle 
constructions. 
In order to solve this problem, Roberts introduces a term from 
Relational Grammar: the chômeur -role. According to Roberts, a -role 
becomes a chômeur when a lexical rule changes its realization without 
deleting it. A chômeur -role can only be realized in non-subcategorized 
VP-internal positions, such as by-phrases. 
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This still leaves unanswered the question of why the Agent -role does not 
show up in a by-phrase, like passive. Roberts explains that the chômeur -
role cannot be realized because of conditions on aspectual interpretation. 
He argues quite convincingly that middle constructions are stative, but 
then defines a predicate as having a stative interpretation only if it does 
not assign the Agent -role (Roberts, 1987: 376). 
 
3.4. SOME OBJECTIONS COMMON TO FAGAN AND ROBERTS 
 
By virtue of being essentially lexical rather than syntactic accounts, 
both Fagan’s and Roberts’s analysis inherits several problems common to 
a lexical analysis of the middle construction. First, they offer no 
explanation for middle resultative sentences. It appears as though 
resultatives must be licensed by some object. Even NP-trace will suffice. 
(33) and (34) are grammatical, but (35) is not acceptable. 
 
(33) Bill beat Rick senseless. 
 
(34) Rick was beaten t senseless. 
 
(35) *Bill beats senseless. 
 
In Fagan and Roberts, the direct internal argument is externalized 
either in the lexicon or at argument structure. This makes verbs in the 
middle voice unergative, like sleep. No difference in acceptability is 
predicted between (36) and (37). 
 
(36) *John laughs sick. 
i.e. John laughs himself sick. 
 
(37) Soft bread cuts into thin slices with no trouble at all. 
 
The judgements of these sentences are clear. (37) is perfect, whereas 
(36) is almost unprocessable. If middles only have one argument at D-
structure, the way in which middle resultatives are licensed is unclear.9 
Furthermore, by their analyses, both Fagan and Roberts make the 
claim that all middle constructions are syntactically intransitive at S-
structure. This claim does not appear to be empirically correct. There exist 
so-called middle reflexive sentences, exemplified by (38) and (39). 
 
(38) Once you have all of your quotations, the paper essentially writes itself. 
 
                                                             
9 For a more thorough treatment of resultatives in a variety of contexts, see Carrier and 
Randall (1988). 
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(39) The Ginsu knife is so sharp that bread virtually cuts itself. 
 
The argument cannot be made that (38) and (39) are normal transitive 
sentences. First, the paper in (38) and bread in (39) are not what are doing 
the writing and the cutting respectively. Semantically, they appear to be 
direct objects which have been moved to subject position. Second, the 
syntactically realized direct object in middle reflexives does not license a 
resultative, as it would in a normal transitive sentence. 
 
(40) John is so clumsy that he virtually cut himself to pieces with his new chainsaw. 
 
(41) *This bread is so soft that it virtually cuts itself into thin slices. 
 
Again, if the verb has only one argument, the way in which middle 
reflexives are generated is not clear. It cannot be that somehow the verb 
retains its ability to assign structural accusative case after the direct 
internal argument is externalized. When some other NP is placed in direct 
object position, the sentence loses its middle reading. 
 
(42) This bread is so soft that it cuts wood with no trouble. 
 
This sentence only has normal transitive, albeit semantically 
anomalous, interpretation. Admittedly, something strange seems to be 
going on, but it seems unclear how either Fagan’s and Roberts’s analysis 
might be extended to account for it. 
 
3.5. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HALE AND KEYSER (1987) 
 
Hale and Keyser (1987) offer an explanation of the middle construction 
which differs fairly sharply from that of Fagan or Roberts. They believe that 
middles are a subclass of ergative verbs. Ergative verbs are defined as 
those verbs which have the following general structure to their lexical 
conceptual structure (LCS): 
 
(43) [x CAUSE [y UNDERGO CHANGE] by ...] 
 
The material in the inner bracket is referred to as the central event. The 
participant y in the central event is called the central participant. Given 
these definitions, Hale and Keyser propose the following condition on 
middle formation: 
 
(44) A dyadic verb V may form a middle if and only if its object is -committed by the 
central participant in the LCS of V. 
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In other words, any two-argument transitive verb where the central 
participant y is overtly realized as an object with a -role assigned to it 
should be able to participate in middle voice formation. 
The actual rule for middle formation is quite simple. It strips away the 
outer cause function, which deletes the Agent -role. This leaves only the 
central event. Hale and Keyser term this the Ergative-Middle alternation. 
 
3.5.1. SOME OBJECTIONS TO HALE AND KEYSER’S ANALYSIS 
 
As Hale and Keyser themselves note, one problem for their analysis is 
the interpretation of with-instrumentals. 
 
(45) The toughest carrots virtually slice themselves with this handy tool. 
 
(46) The hardest granite practically crushes itself with this new hammer. 
 
With-instrumentals are generally interpreted as referring to the Agent of 
the sentence. This is a problem as Hale and Keyser’s rule for middle 
formation strips away the outer cause function, deleting the Agent -role. 
This would leave an LCS resembling (47). 
 
(47) [[y UNDERGO CHANGE] by ...] 
 
After middle formation has taken place, there is nothing left in the LCS 
of the verb with which the with-instrumental can be interpreted, not even 
an implied Agent. 
To solve the problem, Hale and Keyser make the claim that with-
instrumentals have some inherent reference. To them, the existence of an 
instrumental in and of itself implies some Agent, and it is this Agent with 
which the instrumental is interpreted. The problem is that with-
instrumentals do not seem to have this quality of inherent reference. If this 
were true, there should be no difference between the (a) and (b) sentences 
in (48) and (49). 
 
(48a) The ship was sunk with a torpedo. 
(48b) *The ship sank with a torpedo. 
 
(49a) The vase was broken with a hammer. 
(49b) *The vase broke with a hammer. 
 
I believe that it is precisely the fact that in the (a) sentences there is 
some agentive material in the conceptual structure of the verb with which 
the instrument can be interpreted, while in the (b) sentences there is not. 
However, if the position is taken that with-instrumentals have some 
inherent reference, then the contrast in (48) and (49) cannot be explained. 
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A related problem is that this same feeling of agency is still present in 
middle constructions even when a with-instrumental is not present. They 
reconcile the apparent syntactic absence of the Agent with the feeling that 
it does exist by postulating a “means clause” in the LCS of some verbs. For 
example, they represent the verb cut in the following manner: 
 
 
(50) cut: 
[x cause [y develop linear separation in material integrity] by sharp edge coming into 
contact with the latter]. 
 
The means clause in the above example, by sharp edge coming into 
contact with the latter, does not assign any -role, nor does it have any 
strictly syntactic relevance, but Hale and Keyser claim that it is an 
independent, integral part of the meaning of the verb cut. The agency 
which is felt when cut has a middle reading arises from this means clause, 
which by its nature implies an Agent. 
The problem with this solution to the agency question is simply that 
there are verbs which do form acceptable middles, but which do not seem 
to have a means clause as an independent, integral part of their meaning. 
Verbs such as drink, read, and surprise most immediately suggest 
themselves. For example, if surprise were to have a means clause in its 
LCS, the LCS would have to look something like (51). 
 
(51) [x cause [y become surprised] by doing something which surprised the latter]. 
 
This representation seems redundant. In particular, the information in 
the means clause seems like part of what is represented by cause. The 
means clause does not feel like an integral, yet independent meaning of the 
verb. 
Furthermore, like Fagan’s and Roberts’s analysis, Hale and Keyser’s 
analysis cannot account for the middle reflexive sentences in (38) and (39), 
and the contrast between (40) and (41). A lexical rule operates, in the case 
of Hale and Keyser, removing the verb’s external argument. However, at S-
structure, the verb at least superficially has two arguments. This type of 
sentence, where two internal arguments are apparently being realized 
syntactically, has no obvious explanation. 
 
4. A CONCEPTUAL SEMANTICS ANALYSIS OF THE MIDDLE VOICE IN ENGLISH 
 
Current explanations for the middle voice seem unable to account for 
many semantic facts which I feel are central to the construction. However, 
until Jackendoff’s work there was not a system of semantic 
representations that was sufficiently formalized to allow a detailed analysis 
to be undertaken. Now that such formalism exists, many elusive facts can 
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be captured, and a more equitable division between what is syntactic and 
what is semantic can be created. Section 4.1 will offer a conceptual 
structure explanation for what verbs can and cannot form good middles. 
Section 4.2 will examine the conceptual structure representation which 
results from the rule of middle voice formation. 
 
 
4.1. PARTICIPATION IN MIDDLE VOICE FORMATION 
 
The first problem that I would like to address is an explanation for the 
descriptive facts in Section 3; that is, what verbs are able to participate in 
middle voice formation. To that end I propose the following template. Any 
verb whose LCS takes the form in (52) should form a grammatical middle. 
 
(52) [Event CAUSE ([Thing]

i, [Event GO ([Thing]{

j}, [Path TO ([Thing]{

j})])])]
10 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
The rule of middle voice formation will first eliminate the i index on the 
first argument of CAUSE precisely as in passive formation. It will then take 
the j-indexed argument and link it to the Actor position on the affectedness 
tier. This will disrupt the  coindexation with the first argument of CAUSE, 
and the structure in (53) will be the result. 
 
(53) [Event CAUSE ([Thing], [Event GO ([Thing]{

j}, [Path TO ([Thing]{

j})])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
After argument fusion has taken place, the final structure will be put 
through an interpretive component which will evaluate the sentence based 
on Van Oosten’s generalization; that is, the extent to which the surface 
subject can be held accountable for the action of the predicate, and assign 
it an acceptability judgement accordingly. 
The template in (52) appears to make quite a few stipulations about 
what verbs can form the middle voice. It is certainly a complex 
representation. However, we can derive it in its entirety by making only 
two stipulations about what verbs can and cannot form middles. The rest 
                                                             
10 The curly brackets are intended to indicate that either the first argument of GO or the first 
argument of the path function (TO is simply a placeholder) links to the verb’s direct internal 
argument, but not both. I will primarily use verbs in which the first argument of GO links to 
the direct internal argument, but this is simply for convenience. 
 An example of a verb which forms a good middle but where the first argument of the 
path function links to the direct internal argument is the verb butter. An example of its 
middle use is in (iii) and the conceptual structure of the normal transitive verb is given in (iv). 
 
(iii) Wonder Bread butters quite easily. 
(iv) [Event CAUSE ([Thing]

i, [Event GO ([Thing BUTTER], [Path TO ([Thing]

j)])])] 
  AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
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of the observations about what verbs can and cannot form good middles 
will then fall out of the derived representation. 
The first stipulation is that only verbs which assign the Agent -role to 
their subjects can form good middles.
11
 This appears to be descriptively correct. 
 
(54) *Small packages receive easily. 
 
(55) *John arrives easily.12 
 
(56) *Large objects see easily. 
 
In the above sentences, the active verb receive assigns the Goal -role 
to its subject, arrive assigns the Theme -role, and see assigns the Experience -
role. 
This one stipulation will provide almost all of the representation. Recall 
that the traditional notion of the Agent -role is broken up in Jackendoff’s 
system into the semi-autonomous first argument of CAUSE and first 
argument of AFF. If the Agent -role must be present, then the first 
argument of CAUSE and the first argument of AFF must be present in 
conceptual structure. The only basic conceptual structure representation 
which contains both CAUSE and AFF is the one in (57).13 
 
(57) [Event CAUSE ([Thing]

i, [Event GO ([Thing]{

j}, [Path TO ([Thing]<k>)])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
However, this representation as it stands predicts that three-argument 
verbs should form good middles, and they do not. 
 
(58) *Small books put on shelves with no trouble. 
 
So the other needed stipulation is that three-argument verbs do not 
form good middles, but either the first argument of GO or the first 
argument of the path function can link to the direct internal argument in 
the subcategorization frame. This will leave us with the representation in 
(59), which is the same as the representation in (52). 
 
(59) [Event CAUSE ([Thing]

i, [Event GO ([Thing]{

j}, [Path TO ([Thing]{

j})])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
                                                             
11 I do not believe that -roles have any independent existence. I am using the term Agent -
role simply to get at a descriptive generalization. 
12 On the middle reading of *John is easily arrivable. 
13 The basic conceptual structure representations to which I refer are the ones listed in (1) of 
Section 2. 
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Now that we have derived the representation in (52) by stipulating only 
two facts about what verbs can form good middles, we are in a position to 
claim that the remaining ones do not need to be stipulated. We can claim 
that they simply fall out of the representation in (59). 
Given this representation, verbs of permissive agency are predicted to 
be ungrammatical. In such verbs, the outer event function is not CAUSE, 
but LET. Since a verb with an outer function of LET in its LCS does not fit 
the template, all such verbs should not form acceptable middles. 
 
(60) *The VIPs admitted to the meeting with no trouble. 
(61) *Leaves grant easily to soldiers who have been at the front. 
 
These sentences do not seem to be acceptable under any interpretation. 
Another class of verbs which should not be able to form good middles are 
monadic verbs. This appears to be descriptively accurate. (62a) and (63a), 
while grammatical on the unaccusative or unergative reading, are 
ungrammatical on the middle reading of (62b) and (63b). 
 
(62a) John arrives easily. 
(62b)*John is easily arrivable.14 
 
(63a) Bill sleeps easily. 
(63b)*Bill is easily sleepable. 
 
The template in (59) specifies that the verb’s LCS contain both an i 
index and a j index, and unaccusative verbs will lack the former while 
unergatives will lack the latter. 
The template also predicts that stative verbs should not form good 
middles. Since CAUSE is an event, and since CAUSE is the highest 
function in the template in (57), any verb which also has CAUSE as its 
highest function in LCS will not be stative. 
 
4.2. THE OUTPUT OF THE MIDDLE FORMATION RULE 
 
Having discussed the template in (52), I would like now to turn to the 
conceptual structure in (53), which is what results after the rule of middle 
voice formation operates on the template in (52) ((53) is reprinted below for 
convenience). 
 
(53) [Event CAUSE ([Thing], [Event GO ([Thing]{

j}, [Path TO ([Thing]{ j})])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], [])15 
                                                             
14 I am not explicitly stating that –able is a test for the middle voice. I do not believe that it is. 
However, in these cases it happens to convey the same meaning as a middle. 
15 I should mention here that this linking of one argument on the thematic tier to two 
positions on the affectedness tier is a slight departure from Jackendoff. He does, however, 
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Admittedly, (53) is a rather curious structure. The first argument of 
CAUSE is an implicit argument that has no surface realization, and the j-
indexed NP is coindexed with both positions on the affectedness tier. I 
would like to devote this section to showing that, at least from a 
descriptive point of view, this is the way that middles must be represented 
given the formalism available, and that the two main changes do account 
for all the syntactic and semantic observations about the constructions. 
 
4.2.1. THE IMPLICIT FIRST ARGUMENT OF CAUSE 
 
The first curiosity in the above structure that I would like to defend is 
the first argument of CAUSE. The representation in (53) shows it to be an 
implicit argument that is not linked to any other position in conceptual 
structure and which has no surface realization. A natural question then 
follows: what evidence is there for it? Why say that it exists at all? There 
are essentially two reasons. One is speakers’ intuitions. The other is the 
interpretation of with-instrumentals in the middle construction. 
The first argument for the existence of this implicit argument is based 
on speakers’ intuitions. Speakers have a sense that some agentivity is 
present middles, even though that Agent can never be overtly realized. It 
would be nice if the conceptual structure representation reflected this in 
some way since presumably this is the level from which speakers receive 
all of the thematic information about the sentence. The first argument of 
CAUSE is certainly one likely position where such inexpressible agentivity 
might be located. 
The second argument, and the one which can pin the location of this 
Agent down precisely, comes from the interpretation of with-instrumentals 
in middles. With-instrumentals in general appear to be construed with the 
Agent of the sentence, even when that Agent is not structurally 
represented. 
 
(64a) John hit Bill with a baseball bat. 
(64b) Bill was hit with a baseball bat. 
 
However, in Jackendoff’s formalism, what is traditionally regarded as 
the Agent is broken down into two parts: the first argument of CAUSE, the 
external Instigator, and the first argument of AFF, the Actor. 
One way to test which conceptual structure position is the one which 
with-instrumentals refer to would be to find a verb which does not have 
one position or the other in its LCS. While I do not believe that there are 
                                                                                                                                                           
give several examples of conceptual structures where an argument on the thematic tier is 
bound by Greek-letter variable to another argument on the thematic tier, so I see this as a 
logical extension. 
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any verbs which have extrinsic Instigators but no Actor, there are verbs 
which have Actors without extrinsic Instigators. Unaccusative verbs are 
one class of verbs which fit that description. The sentence in (65) would 
have its conceptual structure represented by (66) after argument fusion. 
 
(65) John arrived. 
 
 
(66) [Event GO ([Thing John]

j, [Path TO ([Place HERE])])]16 
AFF (+VOL) ([]) 
 
The fact that the surface subject of arrive is an Actor can be 
demonstrated by using Jackendoff’s test for Actors. 
 
(67) What John did was arrive. 
 
This sentence is perfect. Therefore, if the part of the Agent that with-
instrumentals are construed with is the Actor, then a with-instrumental 
should be acceptable with a verb like arrive. It is not. 
 
(68) *John arrived with his car. 
 
The sentence in (68) only has the interpretation of accompaniment; that 
is, it does not mean that John used his car to arrive. 
It is not simply that there must be some function superordinate to GO, 
however. Only the CAUSE function is acceptable. Verbs of permissive 
agency are headed by the primitive LET as opposed to CAUSE in 
conceptual structure. With-instrumentals are not acceptable with verbs of 
permissive agency either. In (69a), for example, the general is clearly an 
Actor, as shown by (69b), but it is not acceptable. The LCS and 
subcategorization frame for grant is given in (70). 
 
(69a) *The general granted a leave of absence with an order. 
(69b) What the general did was grant a leave of absence. 
 
(70) grant: 
[-N, +V] 
___ NPj <to NPk> 
[Event LET ([Thing]

i, [Event GO ([Thing]

j, [Path TO ([Thing]<k>)])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
                                                             
16 While Jackendoff (1990) rejects that claim that the surface subjects of unaccusative verbs 
begin as internal arguments, I am adopting the traditional analysis of unaccusatives here. 
The distinction is not crucial to my analysis. 
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Only when there is a CAUSE function present can with-instrumentals 
be properly interpreted, and they are construed with the first argument of 
CAUSE. 
 
(71) John sank the ship (with a torpedo). 
[Event CAUSE ([Thing John]

i, [Event GO ([Thing the ship]

j, 
[Path DOWN ([Thing SURFACE OF WATER])])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, with-instrumentals are perfectly 
acceptable in middle constructions. 
 
(72) This bread cuts easily with a sharp knife. 
 
(73) Carrots slice like magic with this handy gadget. 
 
Like passives, these instrumentals seem to be interpreted with some 
implicit Agent, although that Agent can never be expressed. The simplest 
way to account for this is the way I have chosen: There is an implicit 
argument in the first argument of CAUSE which is never represented on 
the surface, but it is there in conceptual structure to serve as a way to 
interpret with-instrumentals.17 
Further confirmation for this analysis comes from Hale and Keyser 
(1987), who note that when with-instrumentals are placed with 
unaccusative verbs, the tendency is to try to force a middle reading rather 
than an unaccusative one. 
 
(74) ?/*The ship sank with a torpedo. 
 
                                                             
17 I should note that this is somewhat unexpected given Jackendoff’s representation of 
instrumentals. They exist across two affectedness tiers, being the Patient on the first and the 
Actor on the second. For example, the sentence in (v) would have the affectedness tiers in (vi). 
 (v) John sank the ship with a torpedo. 
 (vi) AFF (+VOL) ([John], [a torpedo]), AFF ([a torpedo], [the ship]) 
 
Assuming for the moment that the affectedness tier of middles encodes the surface subject 
both as the Actor and as the Patient, as I claim, that leads us to posit the affectedness tier of 
(viii) for the sentence in (vii). 
 (vii) Soft bread cuts easily with a sharp knife. 
 (viii) AFF (+VOL) ([bread], [a sharp knife]), AFF ([a sharp knife], [bread]) 
 
This is not the interpretation which I believe that middles have. It feels as though the implicit 
argument should be represented somewhere. However, this comes into conflict with the 
evidence of the various tests for Actor that I am using in the next section which indicate that 
bread is the Actor. It may be that this is the wrong way to represent instrumentals. I am 
simply pointing out that something seems to not be working quite as expected. 
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A quick comparison of the lexical conceptual structures of these verbs 
will explain this observation.18 
 
(75) sink (unaccusative) 
[-N, +V] 
___ NPj 
[Event GO ([Thing]

j, [Path DOWN ([Thing SURFACE OF WATER])])] 
AFF ([]) 
 
(76) sink (middle) 
[-N, +V] 
___ NPj 
[Event CAUSE ([Thing], [Event GO ([Thing]

j, 
[Path DOWN ([Thing SURFACE OF WATER])])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
The with-instrumental is not possible with the unaccusative version of 
sink because there is no first argument of CAUSE with which it can be 
interpreted. However, at the level of the syntax, the unaccusative is only 
minimally different from the middle, which does have a first argument of 
CAUSE. So in order to properly interpret the with-instrumental, the hearer 
attempts to force a middle reading on the unaccusative. 
 
4.2.2. THE J-INDEXED ARGUMENT AS THE FIRST ARGUMENT OF AFF 
 
The other rather curious feature of the conceptual structure is the fact 
that the j-indexed argument appears on the affectedness tier as the Actor. 
Like the first argument of CAUSE, one reason for positing it is an attempt 
to capture speakers’ intuition. However, additional support for this copying 
comes from the interpretation of manner adverbials. 
Part of what I am trying to capture by having the j-indexed argument 
appear in both positions on the affectedness tier is Van Oosten’s 
observation that the use of middle construction is an assertion by the 
speaker that the surface subject is somehow responsible in some way for 
the action of the predicate. This generalization is reflected in so many 
different ways that it seems to be some fundamental part of the meaning of 
the middle voice. It again would be nice if this fact could be encoded in the 
conceptual structure somehow. I will first survey the range of facts that 
Van Oosten’s generalization can explain, and then I will turn to the way in 
which this generalization is encoded in conceptual structure. 
                                                             
18 Note that by doing this I am taking no position on whether or not these verbs exist as 
separate lexical entries. 
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One of the facts which Van Oosten’s “responsibility perspective” quite 
neatly explains is the discourse amelioration of many middle 
constructions, which was mentioned in Section 3. 
 
(77a) *Small towns level easily. 
(77b) Large towns are hard to level. They have strong defences and sturdy buildings. On 
 the other hand, ?/small towns level easily. 
 
(78a) *Those buildings destroy easily. 
(78b) When asked about buildings built with aluminium siding, the demolitions expert 
said that ?/those buildings destroy easily. 
 
(77a) and (78a) are ungrammatical because, in a context-free situation, 
it is very difficult to imagine that a town could be responsible for its 
levelling or a building could be responsible for its ease of destruction. 
However, when a sufficiently rich context is supplied, one in which it is 
more likely that the respective Patients can be held responsible for the 
action of the predicate, the sentences improve. 
The responsibility perspective I believe also accounts for the interesting 
alternation in (79)-(81). 
 
(79a) This bread cuts easily. 
(79b) This bread cuts.19 
 
(80a) This wine drinks like water. 
(80b) *This wine drinks. 
 
(81a) This soup eats like a meal. 
(81b) *This soup eats. 
 
These sentences are all structurally identical, so there should be no 
difference in grammaticality. The contrast can be explained by appealing to 
the responsibility perspective. There might be some quality that bread 
might possess that would make it difficult to cut. There is not, though, any 
quality about wine or soup which would make it physically impossible to 
ingest. Thus (80b) and (81b) are in some sense meaningless, or perhaps 
semantically incomplete. For example, in (81b), it makes no sense to 
contrast the soup under discussion from other soups by saying that it is 
responsible for its eating. However, all soups will not eat like a meal, and it 
is perfectly logical to contrast this soup with other soups by saying that 
some property of it makes it eat like a meal, rather than like a soup. 
Another contrast which is rather mysterious unless one has recourse to 
the responsibility perspective (Van Oosten, 1977: 460) is seen in (82)-(85). 
                                                             
19 The italics are intended to indicate contrastive stress. 
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(82) These clothes wash with no trouble because ... 
a. ... they are machine-washable. 
b. ... *I have lots of time. 
(83) It is no trouble to wash these clothes because ... 
a. ... they are machine-washable. 
b. ... I have lots of time. 
(84) This book reads quite easily because ... 
a. ... it has very large print. 
b. ... *I can read 1600 words per minute. 
(85) It will be easy to read this book because ... 
a. ... it has very large print. 
b. ... I can read 1600 words per minute. 
 
Since the use of the middle construction is an assertion by the speaker 
that properties of the subject are responsible for the action of the verb, it 
appears as though the reason given in the lower S must be consistent with 
this assertion. If matrix S is a normal transitive clause, however, either 
reason is acceptable. 
Having shown the broad explanatory power that the responsibility 
perspective has within the middle voice, I would like to turn now to that 
part of conceptual structure which might be causing it. I believe that the 
responsibility perspective is a reflection of the fact that the j-indexed 
argument (i.e. the surface subject) appears as the Actor on the 
affectedness tier of a verb in the middle voice. 
The first thing that must be done, however, is to show that an Actor 
position exists at all. Middles are usually stative, so it might be a little 
surprising to find an Actor. An indication that Actors do exist in middles 
can be found by examining manner adverbials such as quickly, slowly, and 
easily. They are quite possible in middles, as demonstrated by (86). 
 
(86) Soft bread cuts quickly. 
 
It appears as though manner adverbials crucially depend on the 
presence of an Actor on the affectedness tier in order to be acceptable. 
At least intuitively, it makes sense that adverbials of manner depend on 
some kind of agentive element for their interpretation. They describe the 
way in which the Agent is performing the action. However, as is often the 
case, the task is to identify which half of the Agent in Jackendoff’s system 
is the critical one. It does not appear to be the first argument of CAUSE. 
Verbs in their unaccusative form, such as break in (89), do not contain a 
CAUSE function. 
 
(87) The vase broke. 
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The conceptual structure representation after argument fusion would 
take the form of (88). 
 
(88) [Event GO ([Thing vase]

j, [Path TO ([Property BROKEN])])] 
AFF ([]) 
 
Unaccusative verbs seem to freely take manner adverbials, and this 
would seem to indicate that the Actor is the relevant position. 
 
(89) The vase broke easily. 
 
One problem is that the other half of the relevant examples does not 
seem to exist, i.e. verbs with a first argument of CAUSE but not a first 
argument of AFF. There are also verbs which have no first argument of 
CAUSE and no first argument of AFF, and those are unacceptable with 
manner adverbials. 
 
(90) *Bill received the package easily. 
 
(91) *John hated Bill with no trouble. 
 
I do believe that it is reasonable to infer, though, that the first argument 
of AFF is the relevant category for the interpretation of manner adverbials. 
The question then remains: if middle voice sentences do contain Actors, 
then what is filling that position in conceptual structure? There really are 
only two choices: it could be the surface subject, or it could be some 
implicit argument, as would be the case in a passive. 
The first reason for the j-indexed argument being the first argument of 
AFF is Jackendoff’s test for Actors. Given the sentences in (92), the 
appropriate tests would be those in (93). Note that since Jackendoff’s test 
for Actor implies an event, I have modified the test slightly so that it can 
apply to a stative verb. 
 
(92a) Soft bread cuts with no trouble at all. 
(92b) The soft bread cut with no trouble. 
 
 
(93a) What soft bread ?does/will do is cut with no trouble 
(93b) What the soft bread did was cut with no trouble. 
 
Both sentences are a little marginal, but (93b) seems particularly so. I 
do believe, though, that this is partly because this quasi-eventive 
interpretation is quite marked in middle constructions, and if a 
surrounding context is provided, I believe that (93b) will improve. Given 
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this, I believe that both (93a) and (93b) are sufficiently acceptable to 
warrant saying that soft bread is an Actor in both (92a) and (92b). 
Further evidence that the j-indexed argument is the first argument of 
AFF comes from the unacceptability of by-phrases with middles. As was 
mentioned, there are essentially two possibilities. Since it appears as 
though an Actor position does exist, the possible representations, again 
taking sink as an example, are (94) and (95). 
 
(94) [Event CAUSE ([Thing]
, [Event GO ([Thing]

j, 
[Path DOWN ([Thing SURFACE OF WATER])])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([], []) 
 
(95) [Event CAUSE ([Thing], [Event GO ([Thing]

j, 
[Path DOWN ([Thing SURFACE OF WATER])])])] 
AFF (+VOL) ([],[]) 
 
It is clear that, unlike passives, by-phrases are unacceptable in middle 
constructions, which is demonstrated in (96). 
 
(96) *Flimsy ships sink easily by the enemy. 
 
It is not the stativity of the construction which is blocking the by-
phrase, since even the eventive episodic middles are unacceptable with by-
phrases. 
 
(97) *The soft bread cut with no trouble by John. 
 
However, the representation in (94) is no different from the 
representation for the passive, since the passive operation simply erases 
the i-index, preventing a link to subject position. There would then be no 
explanation for the absolute unacceptability of by-phrases in the middle 
construction. Therefore, the representation in (95) would be preferred. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In the preceding pages, I have attempted to argue for the existence of 
the semantic representations proposed by Jackendoff (1983, 1987, 1990). I 
believe that reference to them can provide quite a natural account of the 
process involved in the middle voice in English. These are constructions 
which have been somewhat resistant to analysis by Government and 
Binding theory, possibly because they are constructions in which syntax 
and semantics are particularly intertwined, and in the absence of a formal 
system for semantic representations, such intertwining is particularly 
difficult to penetrate. However, with the advent of conceptual semantics, 
we are in a position to sort out in a principled way what should be handled 
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by the syntactic component, what should be handled by the semantic 
component, and how they should related to each other. 
This paper has only scratched the surface of the data. One clear 
direction is to see how the middle voice can be fit into the broader category 
of detransitivized constructions cross-linguistically. Other detransitivized 
constructions include unaccusatives, and both impersonal and personal 
passives (in (98), (99), and (100) respectively). 
 
(98) ENGLISH: The vase broke. 
(99) TURKISH: Bu kopek kulubesinden kacilir. 
This dog house-from it is run away 
“From this dog kennel it is run away” 
(100) RUSSIAN: Pol’ myl-sja devockoj. 
Floor-NOM was washing-REFL girl-INST 
“The floor was being washed by the girl” 
 
The examples in (98)-(100) are taken from Perlmutter (1978). In the 
unaccusative sentence (98), the underlying direct object appears as the 
surface subject. The impersonal passive in (99) is similar. In neither case 
can an overt Agent be expressed. However, (99) has been formed from an 
underlying intransitive verb. Furthermore, there is a feeling of agency 
which is present in the impersonal passive which is not present in the 
unaccusative. (99) can only be interpreted as meaning that humans ran 
away from the dog kennel. There is no such restriction on the 
unaccusative. (100) is a simple personal reflexive passive. It differs from 
English only in that the Agent is expressed in the instrumental case, 
rather than in a by-phrase, and that the verb bears reflexive morphology. 
A conceptual semantic approach to these constructions might be able to 
provide a systematic account of the semantics of these constructions, in 
the same way that Government and Binding theory attempts to provide a 
principled account of their syntactic behaviour. 
I think that so many of the nagging doubts I have about Government 
and Binding theory stem from the fact that it is an essentially correct 
syntactic theory, but that it often tries to do too much. For this reason, one 
of the most important things I hope to do by writing this paper is 
encourage research in the field of conceptual semantics. Almost 
irrespective of whether or not my own analysis turns out to be correct, if I 
have managed to convince someone that conceptual semantics is a 
worthwhile area of research, then I will have accomplished a great deal. 
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